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CONSTITUTIONAL CONTRACTS CLAUSE 
CHALLENGES IN PUBLIC PENSION 
LITIGATION 
Paul M Secunda* 
Whether it be in the field of sports or the halls of the legislature it is 
not consonant with the American tradition of fairness and justice to 
change the ground rules in the middle of the game. 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Because of the economic impact of the global recession and the 
resulting loss in the value of public pension funds, 2 there has been 
increased scrutiny on the effect states' obligations to public pension 
funds are having on the ability of these same states to balance their 
budgets.3 A number of states believe that state pension deficits have run 
amok4 and that public employees are receiving much-too generous 
* Associate Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. I wish to commend the excellent 
research and writing assistance provided by my research assistants, Elisabeth Derango and Nicolette 
Willette. All errors or omissions are mine alone. 
I. Sylvestre v. Minnesota, 214 N.W.2d 658, 665 (Minn. 1973) (quoting Hickey v. Pension 
Bd. of City of Pittsburgh, 106 A.2d 233, 238 (Pa. 1954)). 
2. See Charles B. Stockdale, Douglas A. McIntyre & Michael B. Sauter, The Sixteen States 
that are Killing Their Pensions, 24/7 WALL STREET (Mar. 4, 2011, 6:11 AM), 
http ://24 7wallst.com/20 11103/04/the-sixteen-states-that-are-killing-thei r-pensions/ ("During a 
period like the market collapse of 2008, the value of many large pension funds plunged."). 
3. See William T. Payne & Stephen M. Pincus, The Constitutional Limitations of Public 
Employee Pension Reform Legislation, 19 PUB. LAW. 12, 12 (2011) ("The recent recession has 
refocused attention on the issue of underfunded government pensions in the United States."); PEW 
CTR. ON THE STATES, THE TRILLION DOLLAR GAP: UNFUNDED STATE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS AND 
THE ROADS TO REFORM 1 (20 1 0), available at 
http://downloads .pewcenteronthestates.org/The _Trillion_ Dollar_ Gap _fmal.pdf ("Of all of the bills 
coming due to states, perhaps the most daunting is the cost of pensions, health care and other 
retirement benefits promised to their public sector employees."). 
4. See PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supra note 3, at 1 ("[A]t the end of the fiscal year 2008, 
there was a $1 trillion gap between the $2.35 trillion states and participating localities had set aside 
to pay for employees' retirement benefits and the $3.35 trillion price tag of those promises."). But 
see Florence Olsen, At Actuaries Meeting, Speakers Debate Whether Public Pension Woes Are 
263 
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benefits and paying too little for these same benefits. 5 Proponents of 
cutting public pension benefits have now sought to pass various forms of 
legislation seeking to cut back on public pension benefits available under 
various state employee retirement systems. 6 
Wisconsin provides a good example of one such battle. On 
February 11 , 2011, newly-elected Republican Governor Scott Walker 
introduced his budget repair bill. 7 The ostensible purpose of this 
Overblown, BNA PENSION & BENEFITS DAILY, Mar. 31, 2011 ("[C]urrent debate about a public 
pension crisis overstates the problem .... The "pension crisis" is a direct consequence of a severe 
cyclical budgetary shortfall and not a pension crisis per se, said Elizabeth McNichol, a senior fellow 
specializing in state fiscal issues at [Center on Budget and Policy Priorities] CBPP."). 
5. See JEFFREY H. KEEFE, ECON. POLICY lNST., BRIEFING PAPER #290, ARE WISCONSIN 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES OVER COMPENSATED? I, 6 (2011) [hereinafter KEEFE WISCONSIN PUBLIC 
EMPLOYEES], available at http://epi.3cdn.net/9e237c56096a8e4904_rkm6b9hnl.pdf; see also Press 
Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Fin., Hatch Warns that Public Employee Pension Plans Will 
Bankrupt State & Local Government If Nothing Is Done (Mar. I 7, 2011 ), available at 
http :1 /finance.senate.gov/newsroom/ranking/release/?id=7 5f6d894-7 6af-4e23-96f4-97199fD567 50 
("In a floor speech today, U.S. Senator On·in Hatch (R-Utah), Ranking Member of the Senate 
Finance Committee, wamed of the fiscal dangers involved with expensive public employee pension 
programs, the budget-busting burdens they impose on state and local governments, and called for 
fundamental reforms that put states in charge."). 
6. See JEFFREY H. KEEFE, ECON. POLICY lNST., ISSUE BRIEF #294, DESPERATE TECHNIQUES 
USED TO PRESERVE THE MYTH OF THE OVERCOMPENSATED PUBLIC EMPLOYEE 1 (2011) 
[hereinafter KEEFE, DESPERATE TECHNIQUES), available at 
http://epi.3cdn.net/le05db309d0aa64571_rxm6bngw8.pdf ("[P]roponents claim[] that overpaid 
public sector workers are a drag on state budgets."); see also Mary Williams Walsh, The Burden of 
Pensions on States, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/ll/business/ 11 pension.html? _r= 1 &ref=pensionandretirementpla
ns ("More money, from employers and employees in some combination, will be needed, and 
perhaps much more in coming years."); Randy Diamond, Public Pension Plans Slash Benefits Due 
to Economy, Bus. INS., http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/201 00711/ISSUEO1/307119995 
(last visited May 17, 2011) ("At least 24 public pension funds have cut benefits this year as fallout 
from the financial crisis continues to affect the plans' stability."). 
7. Press Release, Office of the Governor Scott Walker, Governor Walker Introduces Budget 
Repair (Feb. 11, 2011), available at 
http://walker. wi.gov/journal_ media_ detail_print.asp?prid=5622&locid= 177. As of the writing of 
this article, the status of the Budget Repair Bill is very much up in the air. On March 24, 2011, a 
Wisconsin appeals court panel declined to take formal action on a circuit court order that has 
temporarily halted implementation of the law, and kicked the issue to the state supreme court. See 
Wisconsin v. Fitzgerald, No. 2011AP 613-LV (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 201!), available at 
http://op.bna.com/dlrcases.nsf/id/czon-8f9ulv/$File/wisconsin.pdf. Thereafter, on March 25, 2011, 
although the Secretary of State did not publish the bill so that it took legal effect, the Wisconsin 
Legislative Reference Bureau ("LRB") did. Motiori for Leave to Withdraw Petition, for Leave to 
Appeal , to Withdraw Petition for Temporary Relief, and to Withdraw Motion For Relief Pending 
Appeal a t 3-4 Wisconsin v. Fitzgerald, No. 201 1AP 613-LV (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 201!). The 
question that must now be decided is whether the "publication" by the LRB, without the Secretary 
of State's approval, constitutes enactment of the law. In all events, this litigation is premised on the 
allegation that the enactment of the Budget Repair Bill violated of the Wisconsin Open Meetings 
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emergency piece of legislation was to overcome a $150 million doll ar 
deficit in the short-term and a $3.6 billion budget deficit by the end of 
2013.8 The budget repair bill also, and controversially, strips most 
collective bargaining rights from most public-sector employees in 
Wisconsin.9 The debate over the value of collective bargaining rights in 
the public sector has led to massive protests in Wisconsin and other 
states, 10 and has drawn the attention of the international news media to 
labor relations in the United States. 11 
But the collective bargaining issue is really only tangentially related 
to Governor Walker's effm1s to cut public employee pensions in the 
state. 12 Indeed, collective bargaining rights have very little to do with 
pensions in most states, as pensions are set by statute. 13 Additionally, 
there is much debate over whether the current financial state of the 
Wisconsin Retirement System ("WRS") is even a contributing cause to 
its current budgetary situation.14 In any event, the effot1 by Walker to 
Law. WIS. STAT.§§ 19 .81-19.89 (2010). 
8. See A.G. Sulzberger & Monica Davey, Union Bonds· in Wisconsin Begin to Fray, N.Y. 
TiMES, Feb. 21, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/22/us/22union.html ("Mr. Walker, the new 
Republican governor who has proposed the cuts to benefits and bargaining rights, argu[es] that he 
desperately needs to bridge a deficit expected to reach $3.6 billion for the coming two-year 
budget."). 
9. See id. Indeed, the "non-fiscal" version of the budget repair bill, signed by Governor 
Walker on March 25, 2011, eliminates almost all collective bargaining 1ights- except for allowing 
limited negotiation over wages- for almost all public employees, except police and firefighters . See 
Press Release, Office of the Govemor Scott Walker, supra note 7. 
10. See Richard A. Oppel Jr. & Timothy Williams, Rallies for Labor, in Wisconsin and 
Beyond, N.Y. TtMES, Feb. 21, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011 /02/27/us/27rally.html; Joe 
Newby, Thousands Protest in Los Angeles in Support of Public Sector Unions, EXAMfNER.COM 
(Mar. 28, 20 11 II :47 AM),-http://www.examiner.com!conseivative-in-spokane/thousands-protest-
los-angeles-suppOit-of-public-sector-unions. 
11. See, e.g., Roger Wilkinson, Wisconsin Unions Rally for Rights, AL JAZEERA ENGLISH 
(Feb. 20, 2011, 13:02 GMT), 
http://english.aljazeera.net/video/am~ricas/20 11/02/2011220 115031136309.html ("In the state of 
Wisconsin, roughly 100,000 people turned up for a fifth straight day of protests. Public sector 
workers accuse the state's Republican governor of using the c1isis as a reason to attack their union 
rights."). 
12. See Walsh, supra note 6 ("Despite the furor in Wisconsin, collective bargaining does not 
appear to be the main factor driving pension costs higher."). 
13. See Gerald W. McEntee, Don ' t Blame Public Pensions, U.S.A. TODAY, Jan . 17, 2011 , 
http://www.usatoday.com/printedition!news/2011 0118/editoriall8_stl .art.htm (noting that public 
employee pension systems "predated public employee bargaining 1ights, and few plans are subject 
to the bargaining process today"); see also IOWA CODE ANN. § 20.9 (West 2010) (excluding all 
retirement systems from the scope of collective bargaining negotiations). 
14. See CENTER ON WISCONSIN STRATEGY, THE WISCONSIN RETIREMENT SYSTEM IS ONE OF 
THE HEALTHIEST IN THE COUNTRY (2011), available a t http://www.cows.org/pdf/bp-WRS.pdf. For 
instance, a recent report on the financial health of the Wisconsin public pension system concluded 
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curtail public pension rights as part of the budget repair bill has already 
led to the threat of lawsuits based on both federal and state constitutional 
grounds. 15 A potential lawsuit in Wisconsin based on cmtailment of 
public pension rights would be part of an increasing number of state law 
suits where government efforts to cut back public pension rights are 
meeting with fierce resistance. 
This contribution to the symposium focuses both on one of the 
constitutional challenges that is common to all of these suits and focuses 
on the Wisconsin public pension situation in particular. Specifically, 
does the proposed Wisconsin budget repair bill provision that prohibits 
public employers to pay their employees' pension contribution share 
constitute an unconstitutional impairment of contract rights under the 
federal and Wisconsin state constitution?16 The answer to this question 
is quite complicated for at least three reasons: (1) state and municipal 
employers in Wisconsin have different pension anangements based on 
how they are municipally classified under state law (i.e., are they a city 
of the 1st class?); (2) the legislative history of the employment retirement 
system may be substantially different even within a state like Wisconsin 
as a result of constitutional and statutory home rule provisions unique to 
each municipality; and (3) past litigation over public pension rights in 
Wisconsin and subsequent court-enforced settlements may also play an 
important role in deciding what pension reform measures can be 
undertaken by the state. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides an overview of 
state and local pension systems in the United States and highlights 
similarities and differences between public plans and private-sector 
pension plans. Part II then considers the funding status of public 
pension funds in the United States and analyzes some of the challenges 
that the Wisconsin pension plan is cunently facing. Part III considers 
pending public pension litigation in other states. Part IV concludes by 
that, "Wisconsin's pension system is on excellent financial footing and among the healthiest in the 
nation, according to multiple independent reports and an analysis by COWS [Center on Wisconsin 
Strategy] and CEPR [Center for Economic and Policy Research]."). !d.; see also PEW CTR. ON THE 
STATES, supra note 4, at 3 (finding that Wisconsin was a fully funded pension system before the 
recession). 
IS. See, e.g., Letter from Grant F. Langley, City Attorney of Milwaukee, to Aldennan Joseph 
A. Dudzik (Feb. 28, 2011) [hereinafter Langley Letter], available at 
http:// lawprofessors.typepad.com/filesl!angleyletter.pdf (maintaining that pension provisions of the 
Budget Repair Bill unconstitutional as applied to Milwaukee city employees on three grounds). 
16. The Clause provides, in pertinent part, tbat "[ n ]o State shall .. . pass any ... Law 
impairing the Obligation of Contracts .... "U.S. CONST. art. I, § I 0, cl. I. 
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setting up the framework for a potential Contracts Clause legal challenge 
and specifically explores whether a Contracts Clause challenge by 
Milwaukee city employees could be successful if the pension provisions 
of Wisconsin's budget repair bill are enacted in their current form. Part 
IV also asks if any lessons can be drawn from this pension analysis for 
other municipalities in Wisconsin or for other public pension plans in 
other parts of the country. As will be established, the answer to this last 
question depends on whether vested rights, benefits, or terms and 
conditions associated with the public pension plan would be impacted by 
the particular state pension refonn legislation under investigation. 17 
I. OVERVIEW OF STATE AND PUBLIC PENSIONS 
When many people think about employee benefits law in the United 
States, they naturally think of the Employee Retiree Income Security Act 
of 1974 ("ERISA"). 18 Congress enacted ERISA to protect employees' 
retirement and welfare benefits. 19 Nevertheless, by its express terms, 
ERISA does not apply to "governmental plans."20 Consequently, public 
employee pension schemes are regulated by the federal government for 
federal employees, 21 and by state and local govemments for their 
17. A word of caution: pension scholar and expert, Olivia S. Mitchell of the Pension 
Research Council at the Wharton School of Business at the University of Pennsylvania is wary of 
"how much can be learned from one state to another" when it comes to public pensions. See 
Jonathan Miltimore, States Eye MN Pension Lawsuit, WATCHDOG (Aug. 24, 2010), 
http:l/watchdog.org/6322/states-eye-mn-pension-lawsuit/ [hereinafter Miltimore, States Eye]. 
18. Employment Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") of 1974 § I, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 
(2006). 
19. See ERISA§ 2(b). Section 2 of ERISA contains the Findings and Declarations of Policy. 
Specifically, it states: "It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Act to protect ... the interests of 
participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries . . .. " Id.; see also Massachusetts v. 
Morash. 490 U.S. 107, 112 (1989) (citing Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 15 
(1987)) ("ERISA was passed by Congress in 1974 to safeguard employees from the abuse and 
mismanagement of funds that had been accumulated to finance various types of employee 
benefits."). 
20. ERISA § 4(b) ("The provisions of this title shall not apply to any employer benefit plan 
if- such plan is a governmental plan (as defined in Section 3(32)."). In turn, ERISA § 3(32) reads: 
"The tenn 'govemmental plan' means a plan established or maintained for its employees by the 
Govemment of the United States, by the government of any State or political subdivision thereof, or 
by any agency or instrumentality of any of the foregoing." Id. § 3(32). 
21. But see Federal Employees: Bill Would End Federal Defined Benefit Pension, BNA 
DAILY LABOR REPORT 57 DLR A-ll (Mar. 24, 20 II) ("The defined benefit pension currently 
available to federal employees under the Federal Employees Retirement System would be 
eliminated for new hires starting in 2013 under a bill (S. 644) introduced March 17 by Sens. Richard 
Burr (R-N.C.) and Tom Cobum (R-Okla)."). 
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employees. 
As far as state and local government pension plans in the United 
States, their history has evidenced an initial period when such public 
plans shared many of the same characteristics as employer-provided 
pension plans in the private sector. More recently, because of 
developments in how pensions have been structured in the private-sector 
in the United States, there has been significantly more variation between 
public and private pension plans in the United States. 
This state of affairs between private and public pension plans has 
not always been the case in the United States. For most of their history, 
public-sector pension plans were substantially identical to private-sector 
pension offered by larger employers. 22 More recently, however, public 
pensions and private pensions have begun to look substantially different. 
This is primarily because most public-sector plans are defined benefit 
plans,23 while most private-sector plans, including almost all new 
private-sector plans, are of the defined contribution variety. 24 In short, 
state and local workers have much broader access to defined benefit 
plans than defined contribution pension plans.25 
This difference in pension plan structure is crucial. In defined 
benefit plans ("DBPs"), "the burden is placed on the employer to 
contribute funds to the pension plan on an actuarially sound basis so that 
sufficient funds exist to pay the worker when he or she retires."26 DBPs 
22. See Stockdale, McIntyre & Sauter, supra note 2. 
23. See Payne & Pincus, supra note 3, at 13 ("[D]efined benefit p lans still make up the bulk 
of the retirement plans in the public sector."). But see Federal Employees: Bill Would End Federal 
Defined Benefit Pension, supra note 21 on the precarious position of federal employee defined 
benefit plans. 
24. See COLLEEN E. M EDILL, INTRODUCTION TO EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW: POLICY AND 
PRACTICE 121-22 (3d ed. 201 1) (showing that in 2007 in the private-sector there were 48,982 
defined benefit plans ("DBPs") and 658,805 DCPs and that there were more than three times as 
many DCP participants than DBP ones). 
25. Whereas 87% of state government workers and 83% of local workers had access to 
participate in defined benefit pension plans, only 43% of state workers and 24% of local workers 
had access to defined contribution plans. See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF 
LABOR, STATE AND LOCAL GoVERNMENT EMPLOYEE BENEFITS, MARCH 2010 (Mar. 9, 201 1), 
http://www.bls .gov/opub/ted/2011 /ted_201 10309.htm. With defined contribution plans, "employers 
are only responsible to contribute money to employee's individual plan accounts under [this] model 
and that is where their responsibility ends." See Paul M. Secunda, The Forgotten Employee Benefit 
Crisis: Multiemployer Benefits Plan on the Brink, 21 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y (forthcoming 
201 I) (manuscript at I I) [hereinafter Secunda The Forgotten Employee Benefit Crisis] , available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=l656093 . Common examples of such plans in the public sector include 
Section 457 and Section 403(b) plans. See MEDILL, supra note 24, at 104. 
26. See Secunda The Forgotten Employee Benefit Crisis, supra note 25, at 11. 
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place the risk on the employer to invest enough in the present to fund the 
ongoing pension expenses that largely involve pension payments to 
cunent retirees?7 The required minimum funding of DBP plans is 
calculated based on a complex actuarial analysis revolving around 
factors such as age, length of service, projected future salary increases, 
and rate of return on plan investments.28 
On the other hand, defined contribution plans ("DCPs") place all of 
the respective risk (i.e., risk of longevity, risk of investment return, and 
risk on inflation) on the employee.29 In a typical 401(k) or 403(b) plan, 
the employer provides a suitable menu of investment options to the 
employee and then may or may not match whatever salary contribution 
the employee makes to their individual pension account.30 After that 
contribution, the employer is completely off the hook; they have no 
additional pension funding responsibilities. 31 Such consumer-driven 
investment devices have the advantages of pmtability and permitting 
employees to have more control over their pensions.32 At the same time, 
however, the disadvantage of placing the onus of retirement security on 
employees is that they may be financially illiterate or just not properly 
focused on their retirements early on in their careers?3 In any event, the 
DCP conundrum is one that primarily haunts the private sector as the 
switch to DCPs for public-sector plans has been primarily restricted to a 
27. See id. 
28. See PUB. PLANS PRACTICES TASK FORCE OF THE AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, RISK 
MANAGEMENT AND PUBLIC PLAN RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 1 (2010) [hereinafter, AM. ACAD. OF 
ACTUARIES] , available at http://actuary.org/pdf/pension/PPPTF _ Final_Repmt_c.pdf ("Our findings 
regarding public pension systems ... are independent of the financial crisis and encompass risks 
unlikely to go away with economic recovery."); CTR. FOR STATE & LOCAL GOV'T EXCELLENCE, 
STATE AND LOCAL PENSIONS: AN OVERVIEW OF FUNDING ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 2 (2011) 
("Defined benefit pension plan funding is based on assumptions developed and ce1tified by enrolled 
actuaries. There are two types of assumptions: demographic and economic. Demographic 
assumptions include projected behaviors such as salary growth, mo1tality, and length of service. 
Economic assumptions include inflation and investment retums."). 
29. See generally Paul M. Secunda, 401K Follies: A Proposal to Reinvigorate the United 
States Annuity Market, 30 A.B.A SEC. TAX'N 13, 13-15 (2010) [hereinafter Secunda 401K Folfies] 
(arguing that the shift from DBPs to DCPs is troubling in that it increases the risk for employees, 
while decreases the risk for employers). 
30. See id. at 13-14. 
31. See Payne & Pincus, supra note 3, at 13 ("Underfunding is never an issue with 40l(k) 
plans because the retiree receives only what has been contributed and any investment retums. The 
risk is squarely on the worker if his or her investment choices do not perfmm up to expectations.") . 
32. See Secunda 401K Follies, supra note 29, at 13-14. 
33. See id. at 13 ("[N]o guarantee exists that a participant will receive any specified amount 
ofbenefit at retirement and many baby boomers are waking up to this strange new world of being in 
charge of their future retirement."). 
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policy debate at this point. 34 
In addition to this difference in pension structure in the public and 
private sectors-and as discussed in a recent task force report by the 
American Academy of Actuaries-public pension plans have begun to 
also significantly diverge in design and operation from private-sector 
pension plans under ERISA in many other important ways.35 For 
instance, the following significant differences exist: 
(1) Less federal oversight, and thus more discretion is left to state and 
local jurisdictions;36 
(2) Differences in the budgeting process and the applicable accounting 
standards;37 
(3) Design issues, such as (a) the need to make up for the lack of 
Social Security participation and coverage, (b) the ability to have tax 
deductible member contributions and (c) the earlier mandatory 
retirement ages for police and firefighters; and 
( 4) The higher degree of public transparency that accompanies 
governmental decision making. 38 
What all this means is that it is simply not possible to consider the 
exact same private-sector pension reform proposals and apply them, 
without more, to the public sector. This is especially so because public 
pensions, of course, involve the government as employer. Consequently, 
34. Compare Alicia H. Munnell Op-Ed. , High Risks, High Costs, .Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2011 
htlp://www ..nyti mes.com/roomfordebate/20 ll/02127/why-not·40 1ks-for-publ ic-cmployees/40 1 ks-
high-risk -high-costs (arguing against public sector plans moving in the defined contribution plan 
di rec tion), with Joshua D. Rauh, Op-Ed., Starr Paying or SlOp Promising, • .Y. Times
, Feb. 27 
2011 . http:l/www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/20 transorming public sector pension
plans  in to def ined contr ibut ion plans (arguing in favor of transforming public sector pension 
plans into See A M .contribution plans). 
35. ee AM. ACAD. OF ACI'UJ\lUES, .wpm note 28, at 3. 
36. /d. For itl lance. many stutes do not require their public-sector pluns to pre-fund at any 
given level, li ke ERISA docs. See Payne & Pincus, supra note 3, at 13. This stale ofaffa i.rs has led 
to many state and loco! pen ion plans to be signi fi cantly underfundcd.ld. ("Unlike employers in the 
priva te ·ector, which must fo llow Rl A's minimum funding requirements, most states nre not 
requ ired to pref\tnd thei r plan at any level. This complete discretion ha pcnni tted some states to 
'kick the can down the road' and ut off making U1ei r required pension contributions year aficr 
year."). 
37. AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARTES, supra note 28, at 3 . 
38. !d. 
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every time that the state employer seeks to modify or amend the pension 
structure for employee pensions, there are a host of constitutional 
concerns that must be potentially considered. 
For instance, under a Contracts Clause claim under the federal or 
state constitution, plaintiffs may obtain injunctive relief to bar the 
enforcement of pension reform which cuts back on already earned or 
vested pension rights and benefits.39 Remedies are limited, however, to 
injunctive relief because of the operation of the Eleventh Amendment of 
the Constitution and the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 40 Nevertheless, 
the Takings Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the 
Constitution may provide "just compensation," because the cutting back 
of pensions may constitute an abridgement of a property right. 41 Finally, 
because these claims are brought pursuant to the civil rights procedural 
vehicle of Section 1983,42 prevailing plaintiffs may also be entitled to 
their attorney fees and costs. 43 
All of these constitutional considerations are absent when private 
employers seek to amend, modify, or terminate their pension benefits, 
because there is a lack of state action.44 In short, a whole different set of 
legal considerations must be taken into account if a government 
employer wishes to cut back on public pension benefits in order to save 
39. See Payne & Pincus, supra note 3, at 13. 
40. See Paul M. Secunda, Whither the Pickering Rights of Federal Employees?, 79 U. COLO. 
L. REv. 1101, 1111 n.59 (2008) ("[S]tate employers may be able to avail themselves of sovereign 
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, and responsible agents of the employers may be able to 
avoid individual damages liability if they show they are eligible for qualified immunity, though they 
may still be subject to injunctive relief" (citing ERWIN CHEMER!NSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 
8.6.3, at 529 (4th ed. 2003))). 
41. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 122 
(1978) (holding that Takings Clause "is made applicable to the states through Fourteenth 
Amendment" (citing Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1837)); See 
also Prof ' lFirefighters Ass'n of Omaha, Local 385 v. City of Omaha, No. 8: 10CV198, 2010 WL 
2426446, at *5 (D. Neb. June 10, 2010) (finding that cutting pension benefits can constitute an 
abridgement of a property right). Indeed, most states have found that pensions are a form of 
deferred compensation and constitute a property right. See Amy B. Monahan, Public Pension Plan 
Reform: The Legal Framework, 5 EDUC., FIN. & POLICY 617, 625 (2010). 
42. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
43. !d. § 1988(b). Nevertheless, in order for plaintiffs to prevail, they must actually win a 
judgment affixed with the court's imprimatur, and not simply win a favorable settlement against the 
state. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 
u.s. 598, 605 (2001). 
44. See George Rutherglen, State Action, Private Action, and the Thirteenth Amendment, 94 
VA. L. REv. 1367, 1370 (2008) ("All the ... provisions of the Constitution regulate the structure 
and function of government, and if they confer individual rights, they protect only against 'state 
action,' in the broad sense of action by the federal government as well as by the states."). 
272 HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 28:263 
the state money. If such considerations are not taken into account, not 
only will the state not save money, but the state may well end up losing 
additional money in expensive and time-consuming constitutional 
litigation. 
II. THE PUBLIC PENSION FUNDING CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES AND 
THE CASE OF THE WISCONSIN RETIREMENT SYSTEM 
A crucial way in which public and private pensions continue to 
differ is the extent to which these plans are currently underfunded. 
Private-sector pensions-these days mostly invested in self-directed 
40lk accounts- uffered greatly during the financial crisis from 2007-
2009, a they held many securitie subject to the vagaries of the equities 
market.45 However, as tho e same markets begin to recover, there are 
signs that these private-sector plans will again retum to health.46 
Of course, and as just discussed, a larger percentage of these 
private-sector pension plans are now defined contribution plans, 
meaning that employers are generally not r pon ible for having 
sufficient funds on hand when employees retire.47 These employers 
simply make a one-time contribution (or none at all if the employer is 
dealing with a Section 401(k) deferral plan without a matching 
contribution) and there are no subsequent pen ion funding 
responsibilities. Simply put, employees in the defined benefit context 
are left with the responsibility of planning so that they have enough in 
their pension fund account when they retire.48 
Because most public pension plans are DBPs, employers are 
responsible for maintaining the financial health and actuarial soundness 
of these plans so that sufficient funds exist to pay their employees 
45. ee STEPHEN P. U t k u s  & JEAN A. YOUNG, V ANGUARD GRl'. INc., THE GREAT 
RECESSIO AND 40 1(K) PL.A.N PARTI i p a n t  B e h a v i o r  3 (20 11), available at 
hnps:J/institut ionnl.vsnguard.comliamlpdf/ RRGR.pdt'?cbd ForceDomain=true. ("D plan 
participant endured a dramatic collapse in globnl stock prices rrom the market peak in October 
2007 to its trough in March 2009, as well as a severe economic rece sion."'). 
46. See id. at I ("Despite the ubstanti al market and economic shock of 200 - 2009, defined 
contribution (D ) retiremem plan savings for most participalll continued to g r o w  over three- and 
five-year periods. Most metrics of participant. saving nnd investing behavior returned to prerecession 
levels in 20 I 0."). 
47. See supra note 23-34 and accompanying texL 
48. See Secunda 40 /K Follies, supra note 29, at l4. I have argued elsewhere that this reliance 
on defined contribu tion plans in the priva te-sector is likely to going to lead to a massive retirement 
income security problem in the United States. See ld. 
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pensions during their retirement.49 Additionally, as with all defined 
benefit plans in the United States, the Pension Protection Act of 2006 
("PPA"l0 now subjects these plans "to a I 00% of current liabil ity 
funding target, requiring higher funding of 'at risk' DB plans and 
imposing new benefit limits on underfundedDB plans."51 
The funded status of state and local g o v e r n m e n t - s p o n s o r e d  pension 
plans is a major concern for millions of public sector workers, retirees, 
and their family members who are the beneficiaries of these plans. 52 This 
is as a consequence of insufficient levels of state savings leading to a 
public pension funding gap of some $731 billion projected over the next 
thirty years.53 More problematically, only a third of American states 
have put aside sufficient money to fund their pensions, and some twenty 
states have funding levels below 80%, which is considered an unhealthy 
rate.54 As will discussed below, this underfunding of public pension 
plans has led some states to reduce promised pension payouts to retired 
plan members, which in tum, has led to a number of public pension 
lawsuits. 55 
Actually, one of the more financially healthy public pension plans 
exists in Wisconsin.56 Currently, the average public worker in 
Wisconsin gets about 57% of their pre-retirement salary replaced in 
retirement, the eighth most generous state as far as replacement rations. 57 
Most public-sector employees are able to retire at age fifty-seven with a 
49. See Payne & Pincus, supra note 3, at 13. 
50. Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 (codified at 29 
U.S.C. § 1001). President Bush signed the PPA into law on August 17,2006. !d. 
51. Chris Panteli, Releasing the Pressure, GLOBAL PENSIONS, Mar. 2011, at 20. 
52. See CTR. FOR STATE & LOCAL Gov'T EXCELLENCE, supra note 28, at 4 ("According to 
the U.S. Census Bureau, public pension funds distribute more than $175 billion in benefits annually 
to more than 7.7 million Americans, paying an average yearly benefit of some $22,700."). 
53. See Chris Pante1i, Sad State of Affairs, GLOBAL PENSIONS, Mar. 2011, at 22 [hereinafter 
Panteli, Sad State of Affairs]. The Pew Center on lhc States estimate that the tota l cost of providing 
Jlcnsion benefits to nll public employees in the Uni ted States will run exceed over $2.73 trillion 
dollars and that the average total funding level is only at about 85% or $2 trillion dollars right now. 
/d. Even worSe, "[r]esearchers at Boston College's Center for Retirement Research estimate that 
aggregate funding mtios will decline to 72 percent by 2013 under the most likely scenario." CTR. 
FOR STATE & LOCAL GOV'T EXCELLENCE, supra note 28, at 4. 
54. Panteli, Sad State of Affairs, supra note 53, at 22; See PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supra 
note 3, at 4. 
55. See infra Part III. 
56. See Walsh, supra note 6 ("Wisconsin turned out to have the eighth-richest pensions of any 
state, replacing on average 57 percent of a worker's pay in retirement."). 
57. See id. 
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full pension if they have at least thirty years of services. 58 For police and 
firefighters, they can retire at age fifty-three with a full pension if they 
have twenty-five years of service. 59 
Yet, as generous as these pension benefits might appear, recent 
studies do not indicate that public-sector employees make more overall 
compensation (i.e., wage plus benefit ) than their private-sector 
counterparts, as those who have argu d against public employee pension 
rights have maintained. 60 Even if public employees have slightly more 
generous benefits (a common figure is about 5% more generous on 
average),61 public employee make less in wages.62 
For instance, a recent tudy by labor economist Jeffrey Keefe found 
that, 'state and local government employees i n Wi con in are not 
overpaid."63 More ·pecifically when controlling for edu.cation 
experience organization size gender race etlmicity citizen hip, and 
disability, publ.ic sector employees in Wisconsin earn anywhere from 
4.8% to 8.2% le compensation than comparable private- ector 
employees.64 The reason that these figure are important i that they 
play a prominent role in leading state official to target public pensions 
as an unnecessary extravagance that state government can no longer 
afford. 65 Not only are public employees not overpaid, but arguments 
that suggest that public employees represent a wasteful use of tax money 
do not consider that: (1) most pension benefits are set by statute,66 (2) 
pen ion payments represent deferred compensation for which employee 
have bargained for in xchange for foregoing wages in the present 67 and 
(3) without such benefit there is evidence that there would be a ma 
exodus out of the public service and into the private ector.6 
58. See id. 
59. See id. 
60. See KEEFE WISCONSIN PUBLIC EMPLOYEES, supra note 5, at 1. 
61. See id. at 2. 
62. See id. at 9. 
63. !d. at I. 
64. See id. 
65. See id. at 2. 
66. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
67. See Lorraine A. Schmall, Keeping Employer Promises When Relational Incentives No 
Longer Pertain: "Righ t Sizing" and Employee Benefits, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 276, 278 (2000) 
("[E]mployees own their pension expectancies- what they thought they were promised in exchange 
for working at a rate of pay that reflects contributions to their deferred benefits."). 
68. See PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supra note 3, at 3 ("Public sector retirement benefits 
provide a reliable source of post-employment income for government workers, and they help public 
employers retain qualified personnel to deliver essential public services."); Schmall, supra note 67, 
at 283 ("Firms that sponsor plans clearly benefit from them-firms are assured a better and more 
F 
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Yet, even in Wisconsin, where pension funding is considered a 
model for the rest of the country,69 there is still a need to consider larger 
issues that face the state pension system. For instance, the state agency 
that operates pubic pensions in Wisconsin, the Department of Employee 
Trust Funds, prepared an analysis to see whether it had based its 
assumptions on investment gains that were too high. 70 In fact, "[t]he 
study prepared ... was not expected to show, and did not show, that it 
has been relying on an unrealistic assumed rate of investment return."71 
This is certainly good news for the Wisconsin Retirement System, 
because even if investment return assumptions had to be lowered by as 
little as 1%, that could have translated into requiring a 12% pension 
contribution per employee. 72 Nevertheless, even the "eighth richest 
pension plan" has problems that it still must address, including: "most 
retirees in the system have seen their pensions reduced 4.6% in the last 
three years, and some retirees have experienced a 40% decrease in the 
last three years due to the global economic crisis in 2008."73 
The take-home point here is that even the best funded public 
pension plans, like Wisconsin's, may have substantial challenges in the 
post-global recession environment. As a result of the current financial 
state of public pension funds, state officials will likely continue to look 
for ways to reduce pension payments as a way to reduce costs. 74 
Because such state actions will interfere, in many cases, with public 
employees' pension rights, there will inevitably be a continuing trend of 
public pension litigation in the United States for the foreseeable future. 
The next section considers public pension litigation that has already 
commenced in the last few years as a consequence of states beginning to 
reduce public employee pension rights. 
stable workforce, and both firms and employees receive tax advantages through the payment of 
deferred, rather than cu1rent, compensation."). 
69. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supra note 3, at 56 (giving the Wisconsin public pension 
system its highest grade of "solid performer" in 20 I 0). 
70. See Walsh, supra note 6. For instance, Illinois recently lowered its actuarial assumptions 
from 8.5% to 7.75%. See Pantelli Sad State of Affairs, supra note 53, at 23 . 
71. See Press Release, David A. Stella, Wisconsin Department of Employee Trust Funds, ETF 
Responds to New York Times (Mar. II, 2011), available at 
http://etf.wi.gov/news/ht_2011031J.htm. 
72. See Walsh, supra note 6. 
73. See Stella, supra note 71. 
74. See PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, supra note 3, at 30 ("[S]tates' pension systems will suffer 
from their recent investment losses for many years to come. These losses affected virtually every 
large state pension system in the country, sending assets plummeting and leading some policy 
makers and experts in the field to question longstanding assumptions about asset growth."). 
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III. PENDING CONTRACTS CLAUSE CHALLENGES IN OTHER STATES 
Although the reality of public pension litigation in Wisconsin has 
not yet occuned as of the writing of this article, public pension litigation 
is cunently pending in Colorado, Minnesota, and South Dakota.75 In 
these states, state legislation has sought to cut public pension expenses 
by lowering pension cost of living adjustments ("COLAs") received by 
current retirees. The next sections consider the status of the pending 
public pension litigation in these three states. 
A. Public Pension Litigation in Minnesota 
In 2010, a group of Minnesota retirees filed a class action lawsuit, 
Swanson v. Minnesota,76 against the State of Minnesota for an attempt to 
curtail pension cost-of-living adjustment increases for current state job 
retirees and their survivors.77 More specifically, the Amended 
Complaint seeks: (1) declaratory relief providing that the Minnesota 
retirement legislation violates the Contract Clause of the Minnesota and 
Federal Constitutions; (2) a finding that the pension provisions violate 
the Takings Clause of the Minnesota and Federal Constitutions; and (3) 
an award seeking individual relief against the plaintiffs in their official 
capacities under Section 1983 for various federal constitutional 
75. Additional pension litigation could also be forthcoming in New Mexico and New 
Hampshire, where the state has either passed-or is about to pass-legislation impacting public 
employee pension benefits. See William H. Carlisle, Public Plans: New Mexico Legislature OKs 
Bill to Increase State Employees' Pension Contributions, BNA PENSION AND BENEFITS DAILY, 
Mar. 25, 20 II, http://news.bna.com/pdln/display/batch _print_ display.adp?searchid= 14226065 
(''New Mexico state workers and educators will be required to pay more into their pensions while 
government payroll contributions will shrink correspondingly, under legislation (H.B. 628) that 
awaits action by Gov. Susana Martinez (R)."); Jane Blume, New Hampshire's Quiet Revolt Against 
Public Employees, lNT'L Ass'N OF FIRE FIGHTERS FRONTLINE BLDG (Mar. 24, 2011 !2:25PM), 
http :1 /b log. i aff. org/post/20 11 /03/24/New-H ampshiree2 8099 s-Qui et-Revo It-Against-Public-
Employees.aspx ("Public workers will now contribute more money to their pensions. Fire fighters 
are looking to pay 11.8 percent for their retirement contribution, up fi:om 9.3 percent. In addition, 
any fire fighter who has worked less than 10 years will have to stay on the job for an extra five 
years."). 
76. See Amended Complaint at 5, Swanson v. Minnesota, No. 62-CV-10-5285 (Minn. Dist. 
Ct. July 2, 201 0), available at http://minnesotapensions.com/yahoo _site_ admin/assets/docs/201 0-
07 _Amended_ Complaint.236143205 .pdf. There are approximately 130,000 retirees and their 
survivors in the class. !d. at 5-6. 
77. See Amy Merrick, Case Tests Retirees ' Pension Cuts, WALL ST. J., Sep. 15, 2010, 
http ://online. wsj .corn!artic1e/SB I 00014240527 487041907045 7548987254 7 5 665 54.html. 
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violations.78 
The lawsuit was in response to Minnesota enacting a new pension 
COLA provision that either lowered the increase in benefits retirees 
received (which was originally set to increase at a flat rate of 2.5%) or 
completely abolished the increase altogether.79 For the Teachers 
Retirement Association, for instance, there will be a freeze on any 
increases for two years. 80 The State intends to keep its new legislation in 
place until the pension plans are 90% funded, even though these plans 
had not been funded at this level between 197 5 and 2009. 81 This would 
mean that a current retiree who receives an annual pension of $29,07682 
would lose more than $28,000 over a ten-year period if the new law 
were found valid. 83 
The retirees have stated that in the past courts have only allowed 
benefits for current retirees to be reduced when the "employer funding 
the pension plans is on the brink of insolvency,"84 and the retirees argue 
Minnesota is not anywhere close to going bankrupt. 85 The central theme 
to the retirees' argument is that "[t]he retirement benefits from the 
Statewide Pension Plans that Plaintiffs and Class Members receive are 
an integral and significant part of their compensation for public 
service,"86 and once they retired, they "acquired vested rights to their 
pensions, including the right to statutory postretirement adjustments to 
their pension benefits. "87 Furthermore, the attorneys argue that there 
could be a Takings Clause issue because the State is taking private 
property for public use without just compensation. 88 
78. See Amended Complaint, supra note 73, at 13-17. 
79. See id. at 1, 9-13. 
80. Miltimore, States Eye, supra note 17. 
81. Amended Complaint, supra note 73, at 11. 
82. This is the average annual pension benefit payout in 2008 for retirees with thirty years of 
service or more in one of the major pension funds. Id. at 12. 
83. ld. 
84. Merrick, supra note 77. 
85. Jd. The Center for Retirement Research at Boston College Public Plan Database shows 
that Minnesota's State Employee public-sector plan was 85.9% funded in 2009, while the Teachers 
Retirement Fund was 77.4% funded in 2009. See Public Plans Database Search Data, CTR. FOR 
RETIREMENT RESEARCH AT BOSTON COLL., 
http://pubplans.bc.edulpls/htmldblf?p=l98:10:2817977085192158::NO:RP,10:: (last visited Apr. 
25, 2011) (select "2009" as the year; then select "Minnesota" as the state; then select the variable 
group titled "Funding and ARC;" then click "Generate Table"). 
86. See Amended Complaint, supra note 73, at 7. 
87. Jd.at8. 
88. See Timothy Inklebarger, COLA Reduction Laws Under Fire in 3 States, PENSIONS & 
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The State of Minnesota has responded that retirees have no legal 
right to any specific formula for benefit increases and that increases to 
future benefits are "subject to reasonable legislative actions that are 
intended to preserve the fiscal integrity and stability of Minnesota's 
public employee pension plans."89 The State also maintains that the 
cases cited by the retirees have no bearing on the current case because 
Minnesota's laws on worker rights are distinctively different from the 
states cited by the retirees since those cases involved states that have 
collective bargaining contracts.90 The State further claims that the 
"legislature has clearly defined authority to adjust benefits to 
accommodate retirees, current employees and taxpayers."91 In its 
objection to plaintiffs' request for additional time for discovery, the 
State of Minnesota contended that its "case law made it clear the State 
had the right to modify benefits because no contract [implied or 
expressed] existed between the employees and the state." 92 The plaintiff 
retirees have now filed a motion for summary judgment.93 
As of the writing of this article, discovery has been completed and 
the court heard oral argument on cross motions for summary judgment 
on the Contracts Clause allegations on March 22, 2011,94 and a decision 
is due on that motion within ninety days. 95 
INVESTMENTS, Oct. 4, 2010, 
http://www.pionline.com/apps/pbcs.d!Varticle? AID=/20 101 004/PRINTSUB/31 0049980&crit=cola 
%20reduction%20laws. 
89. Joint Answer of Defendants to Amended Complaint at 2, Swanson v. Minnesota, No. 62-
CV-10-05285 (Minn. Dist. Ct. July 30, 2010), available at 
http :1 /minnesotapensions.com/yahoo _site_ admin/assets/docs/20 I 0-07-
30 _Joint_ Answer_ of_ Ds _to_ the_ Amended_ Complaint.236143313.pdf. 
90. Jonathan Miltimore, Minnesota Judge OK's Discovery in Pension Suit, WATCHDOG (Sept. 
15, 20 I 0 7:24AM), http://watchdog.org/6571/Minnesota-judge-oks-discovery-in-pension-suit/ 
[hereinafter Miltimore Discovery in Pension Suit]. An interesting twist in this case is that the public 
employee unions supported the pension changes "because it protected [their] defined-benefit 
pensions by taking responsible actions to stabilize the pension funds," though a union spokeswoman 
has admitted the support was given "reluctantly". Merrick, supra note 74. 
91. Miltimore Discovery in Pension Suit, supra note 90; see Joint Answer of Defendants to 
Amended Complaint, supra note 89, at 13-14. 
92 . Miltimore Discovery in Pension Suit, supra note 90. 
93 . Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Swanson v. 
Minnesota, No. 62-CV-10-05285 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Jan. 28, 2011), available at 
http:/ /minnesotapensions.com/yahoo _site _admin/assets/docs/1-28-
11_Ps_memo_in_sup_of_ motion_for_sj.2919450l.pdf. 
94. See Halunen & Assocs. & Stember Feintein Doyle & Payne, LCC, Minnesota Pensions 
Lawsuit, MINNESOTA PENSIONS, http://www.minnesotapensions.com (last visited Apr. 25, 2011). 
95. See MINN. STAT.§ 546.27 (2010). 
F a 
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B. Public Pension Litigation in South Dakota 
In Spring 2010, South Dakota passed a bill, SB 20, which reduced 
the annual cost of living adjustment increases for covered state 
employees from 3.1% to 2.1 %. 96 This new law also put a cap on the 
amount that benefits could rise as a function of how much money is in 
the retirement system's market funds. 97 
On June 11, 2010 four retirees-two retired judges, a professor, and 
a dean, all from Rapid City-filed a class action suit claiming the 
pension law was unconstitutional.98 According to the plaintiffs, the 
change in cost of living adjustment increases could cause a retiree who 
receives $36,000 in pension benefits a year to lose anywhere from 
$40,000 to $77,000 in benefits over the next twenty years. 99 
The plaintiffs argue that the law violates the federal and South 
Dakota's Constitutions' Impairment of Contracts Clause by breaking its 
pension contract with the retirees. 100 The retirees contend that South 
Dakota's retirement system is one of the best funded in the country, so 
the system's strength is not the issue. 101 Instead, the issue the retirees 
are concerned with is the "unilateral reneging on that promise." 102 
Furthermore, the retirees argue that there could be a takings clause issue 
because the state is taking private property for public use without just 
. 103 compensation. 
The state's counsel has responded to these contentions by arguing 
that South Dakota law allows the State to correct the system if the 
funding becomes too low, and that is what this new law does, because 
96. See Complaint at 7-8, Tice v. South Dakota, Civ. No. 10-225 (S.D. Cir. Ct. June 11, 2010) 
(on file with author); David Montgomery, State Pension Law Challenged in Court, CAP. J. June 15, 
2010, http://www.capjoumal.com/articles/20 1 0/06/15/news/doc4c1718f0bad34188269589.txt (last 
visited Mar. 17, 2011). 
97. See Montogomery, supra note 96. 
98. Complaint, supra note 96, at 2, 10-13. 
99. /d. at 8-9; Montgomery, supra note 96. 
100. Complaint, supra note 96, at 10-13; Montgomery, supra note 96. 
101. Andrea J. Cook, Former Rapid City Judge, Three Others Sue State Over Retirement 
B e n e f i t s  Law, RAPID CITY J., June 15, 2010, 
http ://www.rapidcityjoumal.com/news/aJticle _ dbcl f33a-78bc-11 df-b4d8-00 1 cc4c002eO.html. The 
Center for Retirement Research at Boston College Public Plan Database shows that the South 
Dakota public pension plan was 91.8% funded in 2009. See Public Plans Database Search Data, 
supra note 81 (select "2009" as the year; then select "South Dakota" as the state; then select the 
variable group titled "Funding and ARC;" then click "Generate Table"). 
1 02. Cook, supra note 1 0 1. 
103. Complaint, supra note 91, at 12-14; Ink1ebarger, supra note 88. 
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the new law will save around $368 million in thirty years. 104 As of April 
2011, discovery and depositions have just begun in this case. 
C. Public Pension Litigation in Colorado 
ln February 2010, the Colorado Legi lature pas ed Senat Bill I 0-
001 and it wa igned i_nto law by Governor Ritter on february 23, 
2010. 105 De igned to reduce th fundi11g defi it of the public pension 
fund, 106 S.B. 10-001, among other thing reduced the COLA from a 
fixed rate of 3.5% to a rate that changes annuaiJy, but may not exceed 
2%.107 
Even though only one-fourth of public-sector workers are granted 
collective bargaining powers in Colorado, the public pension benefits of 
Colorado are rated as the most generous in the country. 108 These 
pen ion benefit replace 90% o alary and have annual compounding 
that help them keep up with the rate of inflation .109 Although the tate 
has tried to reduce this compounding of benefit covered tate worker 
have sued under the Contract Clau e to prevent thi from happening. 110 
In any event, this new COLA rate is potentially in direct conflict 
with the benefits booklet handed out to retirees, which states that the 
pension fund will increase the retiree's benefit each year by 3.5% 
compounded annually. 111 The new law could cost a retiree who receives 
an annual pension of $33,264 a loss of more than $165,000 in benefits 
over twenty years. 112 
104. Cook, supra note 101. 
105. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at I, Justus v. 
Colorado, No. 2010 CV 1598 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Sept. 14, 2010), available at 
http:/ /saveperacola. files. wordpress.com/20 I 0/1 0/judge-hyatt-defts. pdf. 
106. See id. The Center for Retirement Research at Boston College Public Plan Database 
shows that Colorado's public pension plans for "municipal" and "state" employees were 
significantly underfunded, at 76.2% and 67% funded, respectively, in 2009. See Public Plans 
Database Search Data, supra note 85 (select "2009" as the year; then select "Colorado" as the state; 
then select the variable group titled "Funding and ARC;" then click "Generate Table"). 
107. Jeannette Neumann, Pension Cuts Face Test in Colorado, Minnesota, WALL ST. J., June 
12, 2010, http://online. wsj .com/article/SB l 000142405274 70446350457 530 l 03263124689 .h\ml. 
I 08. See Walsh, supra note 6. Part of the reason Colorado's public sector pension benefits are 
so generous is because public workers are not p ermitted to participate in Social ecurity, so that Is 
the only p ension they receive. Id. 
109. Jd. 
110. See id.; Second Amended Class Action Complaint at 11, Justus v. Colorado, No. 2010 CV 
1598 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Sept. 14, 2010) (on file with author). 
111. See Neumann, supra note 107. 
112. ld.; Second Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 105, at 9. 
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Three days after the State enacted this bill, a group of plaintiffs 
filed a class action lawsuit against the State to overturn the portion of the 
bill that decreases the COLA. 113 The retirees rely on a 2004 opinion 
written by then-Attorney General Ken Salazar, that a retired public-
sector workers' pension is a vested contractual obligation that is not 
subject to unilateral change of any type. 1 14 The retirees argue that this 
makes the new law unconstitutional because it "impairs the retirees' 
contractual rights to receive pension benefits at the level promised" 
when the employees retired. 115 
The State responded to the retirees' arguments by contending that it 
would defy both law and logic to hold that the COLA could never be 
changed. 1 16 It also stressed the fact that "preserving the solvency of the 
Public Employees' Retirement Association is a legitimate governmental 
interest."117 Of course, Colorado put itself in this funding mess in the 
first place by paying only between 50% and 70% of its actuarially 
required contribution between 2002 and 2008, resulting in an additional 
$2.4 billion in plan underfunding. 118 
In May 2010, Colorado filed motions to dismiss six of the retirees' 
eight claims. 119 The State maintained that the retirees' use of Colorado's 
Constitution for its Impairment of Contracts Clause was misplaced 
because that provision only applied to modifying obligations owed to the 
state, not obligations made by the state. 120 Last, the State contended in 
its motion that pension benefits are not a fundamental right protected by 
the U.S. Constitution, and that there was a rational basis for the State's 
actions. 121 
113. See Marianne Goodland, Ruling on PERA Bill Expected Shortly, COLO. STATESMAN, July 
II, 20 I 0, http://www.coloradostatesman.com/content/991958-ruling-pera-bill-expected-shortly. 
114. See Changes to PERA Retirement Benefits and Contributions, Op. Att'y Gen. Colo. No. 
04-4 (2004) available at http://saveperacola.files. wordpress.com/201 0/0 II 
changes_to_pera.pdf(maintaining that "actuarial[] necess[ity]" applies only to those PERA 
members who are "partially vested"). 
115. Goodland, supra note 113. 
116. Neumann, supra note 107. 
117. Id. 
118. See Payne & Pincus, supra note 3, at 13. 
119. Goodland, supra note 113. 
120. See Goodland, supra note 113; see also COLO. CONST. art. II, § II, art. V, § 38. The 
Colorado Constitution provides that "[ n ]o obligation or liability of any person, association, or 
corporation, held or owned by the state, or any municipal corporation therein, shall ever be 
exchanged, transferred, remitted, released, or postponed or in any way diminished by the general 
assembly." COLO. CONST. art. V, § 38. This provision is very similar to the Contracts Clause in the 
Federal Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 10. . 
121. PERA Defendants' Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss First Amended Class Actron 
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On September 14, 2010, the court denied in part and granted in part 
Colorado's motion to dismiss. The court granted the motion to dismiss 
with regard to the requests for monetary damages under Section 1983 
and for federal constitutional claims, but the parties stipulated to 
dismissal of those claims. 122 On the other claims, including the 
impairment of contract claims under the Federal and Colorado State 
Constitution, the court denied Colorado's motion to dismiss. 123 
On November 23, 2010, the plaintiff retirees filed a motion for 
partial summary judgment on the Colorado on titution impairment of 
contract claim.124 The retirees alleged thal they had a contractual right to 
a patticular cost of living adjustmenl formula pecifically the formula in 
place when they retired or became eligible to retire. 125 On February 23, 
2011, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint, seeking class 
certification126 and bringing claims seeking: (1) declaratory relief that 
the Colorado PERA COLA provisions violate the Colorado and Federal 
Constitution's Contract Clause; (2) that those provisions violate the 
Takings Clause of the Federal Constitution; (3) that those provisions 
violate the substantive component of the Due Process Clause under the 
Federal Constitution; and ( 4) seeking individual relief against defendants 
in their official capacities under Section 1983 for violation of the various 
federal constitutional provisions alleged in the previous accounts. 127 As 
of March 29, 2011, the parties have now both filed cross-motions for 
Complaint at 2, Justus v. State of Colo. , 2010 CV 1589 (Colo. Dist. Ct. June 23, 2010), available at 
http:/ /saveperacola.files. wordpress.corn/20 11/04/201 0-06-23 -pera-defs-reply-in-support-of-motion-
to-dismissl.pdf. 
122. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 3, Justus v. 
State of Colo., 2010 CV 1589 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Sept. 14, 2010), available of 
http://saveperacola. files. wordpress.com/20 I 0/ I 0/judge-hyatt-defts.pdf. 
123. See id. 
124. Plaintiffs' Motion for Partin! umrnary Judgment at 4, Justus v. State of Colo., 2010 CV 
1589 (Colo. Dist. l. Nov. 23, 201 0), available at 
http://saveperacola.files.wordpres .corn/20 I 1/02/20 I 0-11 -23-plaintiffs -motion-for-partial-summary-
judgment.pdf. 
125. See id. at 3. 
126. See Plaintiffs' econd Amended las Action Complaint at 3-4, Justus v. tate of olo., 
20 10 V 1589 (Colo. Dist. L Feb. 23, 20 II (on file ' ith author). The amended complaint seeks 
certi fication of two subclasses - one involving current re tiree in the Denver Public chool Division 
and the other subcla involving current retirees in all other covered public employment in 
Colorado. /d. at 4. TI1e two sub-clnsses are estimated to contain about I 00,000 members. /d. 
127. /d. at 10-13 . The allegation nre very similar to the claims being advanced in the 
Minnesota and South Dakota public pens ion litigation because the ame national law finn. S t e m b e r  
Fein. tein Doyle & Payne (www. temberfein lcin.com) f Pittsburgh filed all three public pension 
litigations. See supra Part liLA-B. 
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summary judgment. 128 
IV. POTENTIAL WISCONSIN PUBLIC PENSION LITIGATION 
In discussing likely Wisconsin pension litigation, it is impmtant to 
keep in mind that what might be a crucial issue under one state's pension 
plan might be completely irrelevant to another. For instance, National 
Association of State Retirement Administrators Research Director Keith 
Brainard thinks that, "[t]he lessons of Minnesota and Colorado will be 
interesting, but they also won't be considered absolute guidance."129 For 
his part, Ronald Snell, director of the state services division of the 
Denver office of the National Conference of State Legislatures, also 
shared the same sentiment, commenting that "regardless of the outcome 
of the three pending cases [in South Dakota, Minnesota, and Colorado], 
states could still move forward with their own plans to reduce COLAs 
because state courts are not bound by the decisions of other state 
courts."130 On the other hand, other public pension officials believe that 
these public pension cases will "go a long way to lead other legislators 
in how they deal with pensions in the future." 131 
In any event, the relevant comparison in Wisconsin is not to 
reducing pension COLAs, but with regard to whether the Wisconsin 
Budget Repair Bill impetmissibly impairs contractual obligations 
between certain Wisconsin public employees and the state under the 
Wisconsin and Federal Constitutions' Contracts Clause provisions. 
A. Overview of Contracts Clause Legal Analysis 
The federal version of the Contracts Clause, in pertinent part, 
provides that, "No State shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the 
128. PERA Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Justus v. State of Colo., 2010 CV 
1589 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Mar. 18, 2011) (on file with author); Plaintiffs' Reply Brief in Support of its 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Justus v. State of Colo., 2010 CV 1589 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Mar. 
29, 2011) (on file with author). 
129. Neumann, supra note 107. 
130. Inklebarger, supra note 88. 
131. Panteli, supra note 53, at 22 (quoting Dave Urbanik, lllinois Teachers Retirement System 
spokesman). The same article points out that some states, like Illinois, have a state constitutional 
provision that "protects pension benefits and does not allow the state to lower them once they've 
been set for an employee." Id. This is particu.larly problematic in illinois where the state's 
retirement system is now at a funding level of about 35%. Jd. at 23. 
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Obligation of Contracts. ' 132 Similarly the Wi consin tate Con titution 
rates "[n]o . . . law impairing the obligation of contract shall ever be 
pas ed.'' 133 ven though both of these Contracts Clauses are written in 
fairly unambiguou language they ' doD not make unlawful every tate 
law that conflict with any contract." 134 lnstead a oomt is tas ked with 
recoocil[ing] the trictures of the Contract Clau e with the e ential 
attribute of overeign power oeces arily re erved by the State to 
safeguard the welfare ofth ir citizen .' 135 
Ba ed on thi. guidance contract clau e claims are analyzed tmder a 
two-pronged test. 136 The fir t que tion is "whether the state law has ... 
operated a a ubstantial impairment of a contractual relationship."137 If 
the court concludes that the contract was substantia lly impaired, the 
court next consider whether the impairment wa "reasonable and 
ne es ary to serve an important public purpo e. '1 8 Where the state is 
alleged to have impaired a public contract to which it is a party "less 
deference to a legi lative determination of rea onablene and nece sity 
i required becau e the State 's elf-interest i at stake.''139 
Who has the burden of proof in this context is al o a ign.ificant 
qltestion and courts di agree over the proper standard. For in tance the 
First Circuit Court of Appeals in UA W v. Fortuno 140 found that 'where 
plaintiff: sue a state .. . challenging the tate' impairment of a contract 
to which it is a party the plaintiffs bear the burden on the 
132. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 10, cl. 1. 
133. WIS. CONST. art. I,§ 12. 
134. Local Div. 589, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Massachusetts, 666 F.2d 618, 638 (1st 
Cir. 1981). 
135. U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 21 (1977) (quoting Home Building & 
Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U .S. 398 434-40 (1934); see also Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. 
Power & Light Co., 459 US. 400, 410 (1983). 
136. See. e.g., Parella v. Rei. Bd. of R.I. E m p s . Ret. Sys., 173 F.3d 46, 59 (1st Cir. 1999). 
omc courts state th·is test ns a three-part test. For example in Reserve Life Insurance Co . v. 
LaFol/eue, the Wisconsin Court or AppeaJ adopted a three-part inquiry to dctcnnine whether n 
state law was unconstitutional under the Contracls Clause. See 323 N.W. 2d 173, 176 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 1982). In  any event , the fac tors in each test are essentially the same. See Chi. Bd. of Realtors, 
Inc. v. Chicago. 819 F.2d 732, 736 (7th Cir. 1987) ("First, we mu t ask whether the Ordinance in 
fact operates as a sub tantial impairment of ex i ling contractual relationships; second, we must 
inquire whether the  city has a significant and legitimate public purpose just ifying the Ordinance; 
and tb.ird, . .. whether the effect of the Ordinance on contracts is reasonoble and appropriate given 
the public purpose behind thc Ordinance." (citing Energy Reserves Group v. Kan sas Power & Light 
Co., 459 U.S. at 411-12)). 
137. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234,244 (1978). 
138. U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 25. 
139. Parella, 173 F.3d at 59 (quoting Parker v. Wakelin, 123 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1997)). 
140. 633 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2011). 
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reasonable/necessary prong of the Contract Clause analysis." 141 On the 
other hand, the Ninth Circuit, in two different cases, has advanced the 
notion that the context and posture in which a contract clause claim 
arises will dictate who bears the burden of showing reasonableness and 
necessity. 142 In particular, the Ninth Circuit has held, in this vein, that 
"[t]he burden is placed on the party asserting the benefit of the statute 
only when that party is the state."143 
Finally, there is some issue with how to style a contract clause 
claim. For instance, unlike other constitutional violations by actors 
acting under color of state law, there is currently some dispute over 
whether claims for contract clause violations are permitted to be brought 
under the Section 1983 civil rights procedural vehicle. 144 For instance, 
pointing to an 1885 United States Supreme Court precedent, the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals has recently held that, 
recourse to § 1983 for the deprivation of rights secured by the 
Contracts Clause is limited to the discrete instances where a state has 
denied a citizen the opportunity to seek adjudication through the courts 
as to whether a constitutional impairment of a contract has occurred, or 
has foreclosed the imposition of an adequate remedy for an established 
impairment. Section 1983 provides no basis to complain of an alleged 
. . . h fi . 145 Impairment m t e 1rst mstance. 
141. !d. at 42. 
142. See Univ. of Haw. Prof"/ Assembly v. Cayetano, 183 F.3d 1096, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(quoting Seltzer v. Cochrane. I 04 F.3d 234, 236 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
143. Seltzer, 104 F.3d at 236. 
144. See Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) ("Every person who, under color 
of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be 
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person wi thin the jurisdiction thereof to the 
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be 
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress."). Section 1983 is not substantive; it merely provides a procedural vehicle for plaintiffs to 
bring constitutional claims against state and local officials. See Chapman v. Hous. Welfare Rights 
Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979). The purpose of such claims is to "vindicate constitutional rights 
and deter violations through suits brought by injured persons to stop government illegality and to 
obtain damages for injuries already suffered." Michael L. Wells, Section 1983, The First 
Amendment, and Public Employee Speech: Shaping the Right to Fit the Remedy (and Vice Versa) , 
35 GA. L. REV. 939, 944 (2001). 
145. Crosby v. Gastonia, No. 10-1153, 2011 WL 818143 , at *4 (4th Cir. Mar. 10, 2011) (citing 
Carter v. Greenhaw, 114 U.S. 317, 322 (1885)). But seeS. Cal. Gas Co. v. Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 
885, 887 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) ("The City's argument that section 1983 provides no relief for 
a party deprived of its rights under the Contracts Clause is without merit."). The disagreement 
between the courts apparently stems from a footnote by Justice White, in his decision in Dennis v. 
Higgins, in which he argued for a narrow reading of the Carter precedent. See Dennis v. Higgins, 
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Whether one construes an impainnent of contract claim as a direct 
constitutional challenge to the actions taken by the state government or 
municipality or as complaining more indirectly that the government's 
contravention of the Constitution deprived the plaintiffs of one or more 
rights protected by Section 1983, the underlying law is basically the 
same. The threshold question is whether the acts of the state established 
nothing more than a mere breach of contract, as opposed to rising to the 
level of a constitutional impainnent of obligation. 146 
In this regard, the Seventh Circuit has commented that, "when a 
state repudiates a contract to which it is a party it is doing nothing 
different from what a private party does when the party repudiates a 
contact; it is committing a breach of contract," and "[i]t would be absurd 
to tum every breach of contract by a state or municipality into a 
violation of the Federal Constitution."147 The crucial question becomes 
whether plaintiffs bringing an impaitment of contract claim, retain the 
right to recover damages for the breach. If the repudiation of the state 
obligation extinguisbe the state' duty to pay damages, it then may be 
said to have impaired th obligation of contract. 148 In most of these 
public pension cases, this threshold issue would not appear to be an 
obstacle as plaintiffs could normally contend that they were barred from 
recovering damages from the State as the result of the State's 
amendment of their pension plan. 
B. Wisconsin Legal Treatment of Contracts Clause Claims 
Wisconsin courts interpret the Contract Clause in the Wisconsin 
Constitution according to the interpretation the United States Supreme 
Court has given its counterpart in the Federal Constitution. 149 As in all 
constitutional challenges, when a law is challenged under the Contract 
Clause, there is a strong presumption that the law is constitutional. 150 As 
far as burden of proof, Wisconsin courts hold that the challenging party 
498 U.S. 439, 451 n.9 (1991). In any case, litigants would be well-advised to consider altemative 
forms of pleading when bringing an impairment of contract claim. 
146. See St. Paul Gaslight Co. v. St. Paul, 181 U.S. 142, 149-51 (1901). 
147. Horwitz-Matthews, Inc. v. Chicago, 78 F.3d 1248, 1250 (7th Cir. 1996). 
148. See id. at 1250-51 ("The analogy is to the principle that government does not violate the 
takings clause if it stands ready to pay compensation for its takings should be evident." (citations 
omitted)). 
149. Chappy v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 401 N.W.2d 568, 574 (Wis. 1987). 
150. E.g., id. at 573. 
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has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the law is 
unconstitutional. 151 
The language of the Contract Clause appears mandatory; however, 
it is not absolute and does not serve to completely prohibit any 
impairment of contract. 152 The Contract Clat1se must sometimes yield to 
the police power, which is exercised for the compelling interest of Lhe 
public. 153 Examples of goals the police power is used to achieve include 
"[p]ublic safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and 
order."154 Use of the police power generally depends on the values the 
state seeks to preserve and whether there is a "reasonable relationship 
between the preservation of that value and the method the legislature has 
employed to preserve it." 155 
While the Contracts Clause is not absolute, it still imposes some 
limits on the ability of a state to interfere with existing contractual 
relationships despite its police power. 156 The United States Supreme 
Court has primarily used the Contracts Clause to limit states' ability to 
modify contracts to which they are a party, but on a less frequent basis, 
also applies the Contract Clause to laws that impact private contracts. 157 
As stated above, Wisconsin courts apply a multipart test which asks 
whether the law substantially impairs an existing contractual relationship 
and whether that impairment is justified.158 
For instance, in Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. La Follette, 159 a health 
insurer brought a claim arguing that a Wisconsin law violated the 
Contract Clause by requiring the insurer to add coverage for chiropractic 
services to existing policies. 160 The court found that the law requiring 
insurers to offer additional coverage under their existing policies did 
impair Reserve Life's contractual relationships because it forced Reserve 
151. !d. at 574. However, and as discussed previously, when the state is the party "asserting 
the benefit of the statute," the state has the burden of "proving that the impairment was reasonable 
and necessary." Univ. of Haw. Prof'l Assembly v. Cayetano, 183 F.3d 1096, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999); 
see also supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
152. Chappy, 401 N.W.2d at 571. 
153. See State ex rei. Bldg. Owners and Managers Ass'n of Milwaukee v. Adamany, 219 
N.W.2d 274, 280 (Wis. 1974). 
154. !d. at 281 (citing Berman v Parkery, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954)). 
155. !d. at 281. 
!56. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 242 (1978). 
157. Allstate Life Ins. Co. v. Hanson, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1017 (E.D. Wis. 2002) (quoting 
Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of Wis., 95 F.3d 1359, 1370 (7th Cir. 1996)). 
!58. See supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text. 
159. 323 N.W.2d 173 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982). 
160. Id.at175 . 
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to offer something additional and to undertake an obligation "beyond 
that to which it had agreed by contract." 161 Courts have also held that 
contTactua1 right conferred pur uani to a municipal pen ion y tern are 
ubject to the Contract Clause, and that a tate law that alters the contract 
i impairing an xi ting contractual relationsbip.162 
ext cow1s consider whether the impairment is substantial. 163 A 
party mu t show that the law interferes with the pa1tie "expectations' 
to prove a ub tantial impairment. 164 Therefore a court con ider 
whether the law wa foreseeable, or even plausible, at the time the 
contract wa made.165 There is, therefore a factual element to 
determining whether impairment is substantia1. 166 Arguing that the new 
tatutory obligation itself is a substantial impairment is not ufficient;
rather, the party mu provide evidence showing the effect of the 
impairment. 167 Although the Re erve Life Colllt found that the law 
impaired a contractual relationship, the court till upheld the law becau e 
the company failed toe tabli h that the impairment was ubstantial. 16 If 
the alteration is minimal the analysis may end at thi.s stage and the law 
will be presumed constitutiona1. 169 
Courts have found that a law substantially impairs a contractual 
obligation when it w1ilaterally reduced "contractually establi bed future 
state employee alary obligations. 170 In this vein cowt have noted that 
interfering with employee pay create a "financial hardship' and "is not 
an in ubstantial impairment to one confronted with monthly debt 
payments and daily expense for food and the other necessities of 
life. 171 Ftuthennore, when the state is faced with a budgetary deficit 
the legislature has many alternatives available to it, such as reducing 
state services not governed by contract and raising taxes. 172 
161. Jd.atl78. 
162. See State ex rei. O'Neil v. Blied, 206 N.W. 213,214 (Wis. 1925). 
163. See Reserve Life, 323 N.W.2d at 176. 
164. Allstate Life Ins. Co. v. Hanson, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1018 (E.D. Wis. 2002). 
165. !d. 
166. See Reserve Life, 323 N.W.2d at 178. 
167. Seeid. 
168. Seeid.at178-79. 
169. See Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 245 (1978). 
170. See Univ. of Haw. Prof! Assembly v. Cayetano, 183 F.3d 1096, 1104 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(quoting Mass. Cmty. Coli. v. Massachusetts, 649 N.E.2d 708, 712 (Mass. 1995)). 
171. See Univ. of Haw., 183 F.3d at 1105 (quoting Ass 'n of Surrogates & Supreme Court 
Reporters v. New York, 588 N.E.2d 51, 54 (N.Y. 1992). 
172. See id. at 1106 (quoting Op. of the Justices (Furlough), 609 A.2d 1204, 1210-11 (N.H. 
1992)). 
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If the impairment is substantial, the court lastly examines the 
purpose of the state legislation to determine whether the impainnent is 
justified.173 To determine whether a law is unjustified, the court 
balances the extent of impairment against the public purpose the law 
purportedly serves. 174 In tum, the severity of impainnent impacts the 
level ofthe court's scrutiny. 175 
Whereas the court applies a low level of scrutiny when the 
impairment is not substantial, the hurdle for the state is higher when the 
impairment is more severe. 176 The different levels of scrutiny that courts 
use to interpret laws challenged under the Contract Clause has been 
described by the United States Supreme Court as a "sliding scale," in 
which the "level of scrutiny given a law varies directly in accordance 
with the severity of the impairment of existing contracts, and varies 
inversely in accordance w i t h  the degree of prior regulation in a particular 
field ofactivity." 177 Where the impairment is substantial, the state law at 
issue must serve a significant and legitimate public interest. 178 
Additionally, as mentioned above, a law is even more stringently 
examined when the law impairs a contractual relationship that the state 
is a party to, as opposed to a contractual relationship between two 
private parties.179 A state impairs a contractual obligation when it 
"prevents or materially limits the contractor's ability to enforce his 
contractual rights" perhaps b y limiting .remedies that would be available 
if both parties were private. ' 0 Moreover, a court also app lies a relaxed 
level of scrutiny when the state has previously defined obligations in the 
challenged area of the law through prior regulations.18 1 
1. Cases Where State Laws Upheld in Contracts Clause Challenges 
A number of cases-not necessarily those involving pension 
rights-have upheld a state law despite a challenge under the Contracts 
173. Reserve Life, 323 N.W.2d at 176. 
174. Univ. of Haw., 183 F.3d at 1107. 
175. See Chappy v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 401 N.W.2d 568, 575 (Wis. 1987). 
176. See Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 245 (1978). 
177. Allstate Life Ins. Co. v. Hanson, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1018 (E.D. Wis. 2002) (quoting 
Chi. Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 819 F.2d 732, 736 (7th Cir. 1987)). 
178. Chappy, 401 N.W.2d at 575. 
179. Spannaus,438U.S.at244n.15. 
180. Univ. of Haw. Prof'l Assembly v. Cayetano, 183 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 1999). 
181. See Chi. Bd. of Realtors, 819 F.2d at 737. 
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Clause. In Chappy v. Labor & Industry Review Commission, 182 an 
insurance carrier challenged the constitutionality of a retroactive state 
law that increased the amount of disability benefits injured employees 
could collect to account for inflation, arguing that application of the law 
impaired its contract. 183 However, because the carrier did not provide 
estimates of how much the law cost its company, the court did not find 
that the impairment was "substantial" and applied a lower standard of 
scrutiny.184 Regardless, dicta by the court revealed that the law did have 
a significant and legitimate public purpose directed toward a broad and 
general economic problem, reasoning that those on a fixed income are 
severely impacted by inflation. 185 
In another case, Home Building & Loan Ass 'n v. Blaisdell, 186 the 
United States Supreme Court upheld a law challenged under the 
Contract Clause. In Blaisdell, the Minnesota legislature passed a law that 
altered a mortgagee's remedy after a mortgagor defaulted on a home 
loan by extending the right of redemption.187 Although the law 
conflicted with lenders' contractual rights, the Court noted that states are 
able to enact laws pursuant to their police power to protect the interests 
of the people.188 
The Spannaus Court, reviewing the Blaisdell decision some forty 
years later, identified five unique factors that led the earlier Court to 
uphold the Minnesota law. 189 First, the legislature declared as a purpose 
for the Act that there was an emergency (namely the Great Depression) 
which required the, state to protect homeowners due to great economic 
distress; second, the law applied to a basic society interest, rather than to 
a single narrow group; third, the relief was "appropriately tailored to the 
emergency;" fourth, the conditions of the extended redemption period 
were reasonable; and fifth, the law limited in duration and would 
182. 401 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1987). 
183. See id. at 570-71. 
184. See id. at 575-76. 
185. See id.at 576. 
186. 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
187. See id. at416. 
188. !d. at 434-35 ("Not only is the [Contracts Clause] constitutional provision qualified by the 
measure of control which the State retains over remedial processes, but the State also continues to 
possess authority to safeguard the vital interests of its people. It does not matter that legislation 
appropriate to that end 'has the result of modifying or abrogating contracts already in effect.'" 
(quoting Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251,276 (1932)). 
189. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234,242 (1978). 
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terminate once the economy stabilized. 190 Therefore, laws are more 
likely to survive a challenge under the Contracts Clause when they are 
expressly enacted to deal with a "broad, generalized economic or social 
problem." 191 
Yet another law was upheld by the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
despite a challenge under the Contracts Clause in Chicago & 
Northwestern Railway Co. v. La Follette. 192 There, the court upheld a 
law requiring a rai )road to staff larger crews on its trains. 193 The railroad 
argued that the law impaired freedom to contract for the number of 
employees it wanted. 194 The court, however, upheld the legislature's 
determination that additional crew members were necessary to ensure 
safety of the public pursuant to the state's police power. 195 
In yet a more recent Contracts Clause case, Chicago Board of 
Realtors, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 196 the Seventh Circuit upheld an 
Illinois law that altered the relationship between landlords and tenants in 
Chicago. The new law, which applied prospectively, contained a number 
of requirements landlords found objectionable, including a prohibition 
for charging more than ten dollars per month for late rent and requiring 
landlords to keep security deposits in a federally insured account in a 
bank located in Illinois. 197 The landlords brought suit under the 
Contracts Clause. Applying the sliding scale of scrutiny discussed 
above, the court analyzed the law under a lowered level of scrutiny due 
to heavy prior regulation by the legislature of landlord-tenant law and 
because the state was not a party to the contracts. 198 Under this lower 
level of scrutiny, the court upheld the new landlord-tenant law, finding 
that the law did not impair contractual obligations for constitutional 
purposes due to prior regulation in the area and because it was rational to 
believe the law would lead to improved public health and welfare. 199 
Finally, foreseeability of future regulation was also a factor in the 
Contracts Clause case of Allstate Life Insurance Co. v. Hanson. 200 In 
190. See id. 
191. See id. at 250. 
192. 169 N. W.2d 441 (Wis. 1969). 
193. See id. at 454. 
194. See id. at 446. 
195. See id. at 454. 
196. 819 F.2d 732 (7th Cir. 1987). 
197. See id. at 734. 
198. See id. at 736-37. 
199. See id. 
200. 200 F. Supp. 2d 1012 (E.D. Wi s. 2002). 
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Allstate Life, the Eastern District of Wisconsin upheld a new, retroactive 
law that created the presumption that divorce revokes beneficiary status 
for former spouses.201 A former wife argued that the law was 
unconstitutional under the Contracts Clause because it interfered with 
her entitlement to benefits fi:om her deceased ex-husband's life 
insurance policy??02 
The court found that the law was not unconstitutional for a number 
of reasons. First, the law did not change the obligations under the 
contract between Allstate and the deceased ex-husband; it only impacted 
the interests of the beneficiary???? Second, the court found it significant 
that a change in the law was foreseeable due to prior regulation by 
Wisconsin in asset transfers due to death.204 Futthermore, the law did not 
impose a severe restriction because it only established a default rule that 
the spouses could have opted out of through any affi1mative act that 
showed the deceased's intent.205 Finally, the court found that the law 
served a significant and legitimate public purpose because it created 
uniformity within Wisconsin's estate law and made Wisconsin's law 
consistent with that of other states. ???
?
2. Cases Where Law Found Unconstitutional Under Contract Clause 
Of course, not all applicable federal and state cases uphold state 
laws challenged under the Contracts Clause. For instance, in State ex 
ref. Building Owners & Managers Ass 'n. of Milwaukee, Inc. v. 
Adamany????? the Wisconsin legislature enacted a law that required 
landlords to pass tax reduction savings on to their tenants. 208 When 
landlords challenged the law under the Contracts Clause, the court found 
that the law impermissibly impaired the obligation of contracts because 
it was unclear what vital purpose the law served that justified depriving 
the landlords of rent for which they bargained.209 
In Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus,210 an Illinois corporation 
201. See id. at 1021. 
202. See id. at 1014. 
203. See id. at 1020. 
204. I d. 
205. I d. 
206. See id. at 1021. 
207. 219 N.W.2d 274 (Wis. 1974). 
208. !d. at 276. 
209. I d. at 284-86. 
210. 438 U.S. 234 (1978). 
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brought suit under the Contracts Clause when Minnesota enacted a law 
that had a substantial effect on the corporation's existing pension plan.211 
The corporation's voluntary pension plan had length of service and age 
conditions for rights to vest, did not require the corporation to make 
contributions, and was subject to termination for any reason.212 The new 
Minnesota pension law provided for a "pension funding charge" if a 
company terminated a plan or closed an office. 213 When the corporation 
closed its Minnesota office a few months after the law was enacted, the 
State assessed a pension funding charge of $185,000 against the 
214 corporatwn. 
The Court held that the Minnesota pension law was 
unconstitutional under a Contracts Clause analysis because the law 
substantially impaired an existing contract by changing express terms 
and imposing unexpected liability. 215 Moreover, there was no evidence 
that the law was enacted to meet an important general social interest. 216 
The law also only impacted an extremely narrow class-private 
corporations with voluntary pension plans who either closed an office or 
terminated their pension plans.217 Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court also 
found it relevant that the State was regulating in an area that was not 
subject to regulation when the corporation created its contractual 
obligation by enacting a pension plan, which made its intrusion 
unforeseeable. 21 8 
As will be discussed in the next section, the U.S. Supreme Court's 
decision in Spannaus provides a good model for analyzing pending 
Contracts Clause challenges to Wisconsin's controversial budget repair 
bill. 
C. Potential Contract Clause Challenge to the Wisconsin Budget Repair 
Bill's Pension Provisions: The Case of Milwaukee City Employees 
To determine whether a state law is unconstitutional pursuant to the 
211. See id. at 23 8-40. 
212. /d. at 237. 
213 . Id. at 23 8. 
214. Id. at 239. 
215. See id. at 247,250-51. 
216. /d. at 247. 
217. See id. at 248. 
218. See id. at 250. 
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Federal and State Contracts Clause, courts essentially ask: (1) is the 
contractual obligation impaired; (2) i the impairment sub tantia?? and 
(3) ?  the impairment ju tified?219 o??ts al:o apply different levels of 
crutiny depending on facto rs such as whether the tate previou ly 
regulated the area of law at i ue and whether the state is a party to the 
coutract.220 Other relevant factors in determining whether a law should 
be upheld or struck down as unconstitutional include tho e di cus ed in 
Spannaus: (I) whether the Jegi lature articulated a purpose for the law 
that applie generally, rather than just to a narrow group; (2) if the 
regulation wa foreseeable; (3) if the law was cr ated for public afety 
reasons, and (4) if the law was enacted pur uant to an emergency or if 
the law is temporary. 221 
1. Application ofBudget Repair Pension Provisions to City of 
Milwaukee Employee Retirement System 
Just taking, for present purpo es the pension provi ion of the 
Budget Repair Bill that applies to Wisconsin cities of the first class 
(which only includes Milwaukee), it appears that the law may ??deed run 
afoul of the federal and Wisconsin constitutional prohibition again t 
impairment of contracts. That provision states: 
62.623 Payment of contributions in an employee retirement system of 
a 1st class city. Beginning on the effective date of thi ection .. . in 
any employee retirement system of a 1 ola city, ... employees hall 
pay a ? ? employee required contributions for funding benefit under the 
retirement sy tern. Tl1e employer may uot pay on behalf of an 
employee any of the employee's sl1are of the required cont:ributions. 222 
The effect of this provision on the pension rights of Milwaukee city 
employees will likely be dramatic. For instance, a contribution 
requirement of 5.5% of "an employee's pay would be equivalent to 
219. Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. La Follette, 323 N.W.2d 173, 176 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982) (citing 
Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234,244-45 ( 1978)). 
22·0. See Ass'n of Surrogates and Supreme Court Reporters v. cw York 940 ?.2d 766, 773-
74 (2d Cir. 1991) ("When a S?ate itself enters into a contract it cannot simply walk away from its 
financial obligations. ln almost every case the Court ?as held a govemmemal unit to it contractual 
obligation?when it enters financial or other market .'' (quoting Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. 
Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400,410 (1983))). 
221. See supra note 191 and accompanying text. 
222. Wisconsin Budget Repair Bill, 2011 Wis. Act 10, § 167 (to be codified at WIS. STAT. § 
62.623). 
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114.4 hours of pay ... [or] equivalent to [a] loss of 14.3 days of pay, 
assuming an eight-hour day." 223 So not only would such a requirement 
that the city cannot pay employee pension contributions be an 
impairment of the pension contract that the Milwaukee City employees 
have with the state,224 but it would be quite a substantial impairment.225 
Indeed, other cases from other courts stand for the proposition that state 
legislation that has the effect of reducing the pension rights of public 
employees to this magnitude would satisfy the requirement that the 
contractual impairment in question is substantial. 226 
Under the Contracts Clause analysis described above, that leaves 
the important question of whether this substantial impairment is 
justified.227 One would speculate that the reason that the Governor of 
Wisconsin, Scott Walker, would give for the need for these new pension 
provisions is that the state is facing a budget emergency, with the state 
being in the red over $150 million in the short-term and $3.6 billion 
dollars through 2013.228 
Yet, state legislation that substantially impairs contracts right is 
usually not upheld because the test for constitutionally in the Seventh 
Circuit is a difficult one: 
[A] court should uphold a challenged statute if it "reasonabl[y] and 
appropriate[ly]" serves "a significant and legitimate public purpose" 
223 . Langley Letter, supra note 15, at 11. 
224. See State ex rei. Bartle! v. Thompson, 16 N.W.2d 420, 421 (Wis. 1944) (holding that 
municipal pension systems that confer contractual rights upon member-beneficiaries are subject to 
the strictures of the Federal and State Contracts Clause against impainnent by subsequent 
legislation); see also State ex rei. O'Neil v. Blied, 206 N.W. 213,214 (Wis. 1925); Benson v. Gates, 
525 N.W.2d 278, 285-86 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (citing Blied, 206 N.W. at 214). Milwaukee City 
Attorney Langley concluded in this regard that "[t]he session laws, charter ordinances, court 
opinions, and the [Global Pension Settlement ("GPS")] ... strongly support the proposition that any 
employee whose share of pension contributions is currently paid by the City has a vested contractual 
right to a continuation of !his practice."). See Langley Letter, supra note 15, at 11. 
225. See. e.g., Langley Letter, supra note 15, at 11 ("The imposition of a pension contribution 
requirement of 5.5 or 7 percent of salary would almost certainly be deemed a substantial impairment 
of members' vested rights."). 
226. See, e.g., Univ. of Haw. Prof ? ?Assembly v. Cayetano, 183 F.3d 1096, 1099, 1104 (9th 
Cir. 1999) (findir.g that a statute delaying payment of wages for six day period constituted a 
substantial impairment); Ass'n of Surrogates and Supreme Court Reporters v. New York, 940 F.2d 
766, 772 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that statute that provided for withholding of 10-days' pay prior to 
retirement constituted substantial impairment); Mass. Cmty. Coli. v. Massachusetts, 649 N.E.2d 
708, 712 (Mass. 1995) (finding that between two and fifteen day furloughs of public employees 
constituted a substantial impainnent). 
227. See supra text accompanying note 223. 
228. See supra note 8. 
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when balanced against the severity of the impairment. '[T]he Supreme 
Court has suggested that a ort of sliding sca le i. appropriate 
[whereby] ... the level of crutiny given a law varies directly in 
accordance with the severity of U1e impairment of existing contracts 
and varies inversely in accordance with the degree of prior regulation 
. . 1 fi ld f . . 229 tn a part?cu? ar 1e o act1v1ty. 
In short, a court would balance the ubstantiality of the contract 
impairment against the interest the state is eeking to erve by pa sing 
the legis?ation.?230 
As already noted, the impairment on the vested pension right of 
Milwaukee City employees would be quite evere; in the range of about 
two week of pay. Wisconsin would argue that such pension pr visions 
are requiTed given its current tate budget emergency. Yet that budget 
emergency claim does not appear legitimate upon clo er examination. 
A already discus ed, the Wisconsin Retirement Sy tern i one of the 
healthiest in the country and ba not been ignificantly w1derfunded in 
the la t twenty-five year .231 Moreover pension plans are not funded by 
general tax revenue but by compensation commitment to employees in 
th fonu of deferred compen ation.232 So, it i far from clear how 
imposing these additional pension contribution requirements on 
Milwaukee city employees will reduce the structural deficit that 
Wisconsin now faces. 
Furthermore, some of the other relevant factors discu sed earlier in 
this section will likely favor public employees in this con titutional 
balancing test. For instance, the law was not created for public safety 
reasons the law doe not appear to be enacted pur uant to an emergency 
and the law is not temporary. 233 Moreover the Wi cons in legi lature has 
given individual munici.patitie , like Milwaukee the authority to decide 
local pen ion issues under its state-based con titutional home rule 
authority.234 And because it is the tate and not the city that i eeking 
th is pension contract chance a court might give additional scrutiny to 
the ?eed for uch a change. Finally a court would more cl e ly 
229. See Allstate Life Ins. Co. v. Hanson, 200 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1018 (E.D. Wis. 2002) 
(quoting Chi. Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 819 F.2d 732,736 (7th Cir. 1987). 
230. See State ex rei. Cannon v. Moran, 331 N.W.2d 369,376-78 (Wis. 1983). 
231. See supra notes 14 and 66. 
232. See Schmall, supra note 64, at 279. 
233. See supra note 187 and accompanying text. 
234. See Langley Letter, supra note 15, at 2-3 (citing WIS. CoNST. art. XI, § 3(1) (establishing 
a municipal home rule in 1924)). 
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scrutinize a law impairing a contractual obligation between the City of 
Milwaukee and its employees because Wisconsin is a party to the 
contract.235 
In any event, Wisconsin courts have limited the acceptable reasons 
for substantially impairing a pension contract to those dealing with the 
financial stability of the plan and do not consider other reasons, such as 
the need of the state to balance its budget.236 In short, most courts to 
have considered Contracts Clause challenges regarding pension 
obligations have concluded that even rather minor impairments of 
employee contract rights involving compensation are legally 
unjustified.237 Thus, in the particular situations involving the application 
of the pension provisions of the budget repair bill to the City of 
Milwaukee's retirement system, a Contracts Clause violation is likely to 
be found. 
2. The Uncertain Meaning of the Milwaukee Pension Analysis to 
Other Public Pension Plans in Wisconsin and Elsewhere 
The above analysis of how the budget repair bill applies to the 
Milwaukee city employees' pension rights does not mean, however, that 
public pension litigation involving other municipalities in Wisconsin, or 
other states and municipalities in the United States, will come out the 
same way. This is because of a crucial distinction in how Milwaukee 
city employees are treated under applicable public pension law and how 
public employees may fair as far as their pension rights in other parts of 
235 . Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234,244 n.15 (1978). 
236. See Ass'n of State Prosecutors v. Milwaukee Cnty., 544 N.W.2d 888, 893 (Wis. 1996) 
("[L]egislature[s] should retain a limited power to adjust or amend a retirement plan in certain 
situations, such as when it is necessary to preserve the actuarial soundness of a plan or to salvage 
financially troubled funds."); Milwaukee Police Ass'n v. City of Milwaukee, 588 N.W.2d 636, 639 
(Wis. Ct. App. 1998) ("[A]lthough the state has 'a limited power to adjust or amend a retirement 
plan in certain situations,' and may intervene to 'preserve the actuarial soundness of a plan or to 
salvage' it if it is financially strapped, it may not raid it, even by a little bit." (citing Ass'n of State 
Prosecutors, 544 N.W.2d at 893)). 
237. See, e.g., Ass'n of Surrogates & Supreme Court Reporters v. New York, 940 F.2d 766, 
773-74 (2d Cir. 1991). The Contract Clause "is especially vigilant when a state takes libetties with 
its own obligations." I d. at 773 (citing Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 
U.S. 400, 412 n.14 (1983). "When a State itself enters into a contract, it cannot simply walk away 
fi·om its financial obligations. In almost every case, the Court has held a governmental unit to its 
contractual obligations when it enters financial or other markets." /d. at 774 (quoting Energy 
Reserves Grp., 459 U.S. at 412 n.14). 
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Wisconsin or other parts ofth country. 
In short, a large number of Milwaukee city employee work under 
collective bargaining agreements where the city ba agreed to pay for the 
employee share of pension contributions and such employees have been 
found to have a vested right in City-paid contributions.238 The ve ted 
nature of these right stem from a unique and long history urrounding 
??? provision of public pen ion in Milwaukee. For in tance the 1947 
se . ion law that ???????????control of the Milwaukee Employes' 
Retirement y tem to tbe ity 'declared that cities of the first class are 
entitled to the largest measure of self-government over their pension 
plans."239 Under this same 1947 session law, Section 30 stated in 
petiinent part: 
Every such member and beneficiary shall be deemed to have accepted 
the provisioDs of thi act and shall thereby have a benefit contract in 
aid retirement system of which he is uch member or beneficiary ... . 
The alllluities and all other benefit . . . hall be obligation of such 
benefit contract . .. and each member and beneficiary having such a 
benefit contract sball have a vested right to such annuities and other 
benefit · and they shall not be diminished or impaired by subsequent 
legislation or by any other means without his consent.240 
Perhaps, even more significantly the Milwaukee Home Rule 
Charter fixes the vested and contractual rights of city employee as of 
the date of the member's initial employme.nt. 241 These provision have 
been interpreted to mean that the retirement benefit in effi ct when a 
Milwaukee city employee becomes a member of the city pension system 
are vested and cannot be changed unless the employee agrees. 242 In 
other words, vested pension benefit rights include the city paying the 
employee's share of pension contributions.243 
Finally, the Milwaukee pen ion y tern is distinct because of its 
past litigation hi tory. A number of plaintiffs sued Milwaukee in a 
238. See Langley Letter, supra note 15, at 2, n.J. 
239. See id. at 4 (citing Milwaukee City Charter, § 36-14 (Oct. 12, 2010), available at 
http://cctv25. milwaukee. gov/netit-code81 /charter_/ch36/CH36. pdf). 
240. Milwaukee City Charter,§ 36-13·2-a (emphasis added). 
241. Milwaukee ity harter § 36-13-2-c; see also Milwaukee City Charter § 36-08-7-a-1 
("( ommencing with the first pay period of 1970, the city shall contribute on behalf of general city 
employees 5.5% of such member's earnable compensation."). 
242. Langley Lellcr, s u p r a  note 15, at (citing Milwaukee Police Ass'n v. City of Milwaukee, 
588 N.W.2d 636 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998)). 
243. Id. 
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number of different cases in the years prior to 2000 because of its 
governance of the city pension plan.244 As a consequence of this 
litigation, the City entered into a Global Pension Settlement ("GPS") 
with almost all of its public employees. 245 In pertinent part, the GPS 
states: "Every member [of the Employes' Retirement System] ... shall 
have a vested and contractual right to the benefits in the amount and on 
the terms and conditions as provided in the law on the date the combined 
[city pension] fund is created."246 The city paying for the city 
employees ' pension contributions is considered one such pension term 
and condition under the GPS. 
Thus, only through obtaining voluntary consents could employee 
contributions to the state pension plan be required by city 
employees.247Indeed, the only way that such increased contributions 
have been possible in the past, and the way it worked under the GPS, is 
by the city offering enhanced pension benefits to covered employees in 
exchange for individual waivers.248 
So, although Milwaukee city employees may have vested 
contractual rights to have the city pay their share of pension 
contributions, it is unclear whether other municipalities in Wisconsin, or 
elsewhere in the country for that matter, have similar vesting language in 
their pension statutes, ordinances, court opinions, and/or case 
settlements. Each public pension plan must be considered on its own to 
determine whether public pension provisions provide an argument that 
some vested contractual right, benefit, or pension term and condition has 
been unilaterally eliminated or reduced through enactment of state 
pension reform legislation. Only under these conditions, will a 
constitutional Contracts Clause challenge be potentially successful when 
such legislation seeks to curtail public employee pension rights. 
CONCLUSION 
The recent spate of high profile efforts by state governors to roll 
back public employee pension rights in light of recent budgetary 
challenges has shone the light directly on the importance to public 
employees of the Contracts Clause provisions of the Federal and State 
244. !d. at I 0. 
245. See id. 
246. Milwaukee City Charter§ 36-13-2-g. 
247. See Langley Letter, supra note 15, at 2. 
248. !d. 
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Constitutions. Using as an example the controversial budget repair bill 
in Wisconsin and the application of the bill's pension provisions to 
Milwaukee City employee pension rights th i article has sought to show 
how, under certain pecified circumstances, such legi lative attempts 
may be constitutionally impcrmi sible if uch laws ubstantially impair 
employee contract with the state ??????t the necessary legal 
justification. 
Although such Contracts Clause litigation might be successful in a 
suit brought by the City of Milwaukee on behalf of its employees, it is 
unclear whether such arguments will be successful in other parts of 
Wisconsin or in other states. As the examination of pending pension 
litigation in other states underscores, there will also be different types of 
state legi lation thai may run afoul of pension right under the particular 
provision of states pension Law . Because of the Lack of legal 
uniformity in public pension regulation from one state to the next, the 
only possible way to determine whether state curtailment of public 
employee pension rights will be constitutional is by undertaking an in-
depth legal analy is of ??? applicable pension laws, regulations, 
ordinances court opinions and prior settlements. 
